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BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #8701
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JOLENE MARIE CARUSO,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 44055
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2006-125
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jolene Caruso contends the district court abused its discretion by denying her
oral motion for a sentence reduction (hereinafter, Rule 35 motion) when it revoked
probation and executed her sentence following a probation violation. She asserts the
district court did not give sufficient consideration to the mitigating factors in the record.
As such, this Court should reduce her sentence as it deems appropriate, or,
alternatively, remand this case for a new disposition determination.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
As defense counsel explained at the most recent disposition hearing, “This is an
old probation case. It has been going on since 2006. We have over nine years at this
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point.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.13-15.) Ms. Caruso was initially sentenced to a unified term of ten
years, with two years fixed, for grand theft, to be served concurrently with a sentence
from an unrelated case.1 (R., pp.107-08.) That sentence was suspended for a period
of probation following her successful completion of a rider program during a period of
retained jurisdiction.2 (R., pp.33-34, 37; Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), pp.72-74.)
After successfully serving six years on probation, Ms. Caruso’s probation officer
requested the district court authorize unsupervised probation because Ms. Caruso “has
satisfactorily complied with the terms of her probation and is functioning as a socially
acceptable, self-supporting member of society. Record checks have been completed
and it appears she has refrained from further criminal activity. All court costs and fines
have been paid in full. The defendant has maintained full time employment.” (R., p.46.)
Alongside the court costs and fines, Ms. Caruso had also paid restitution in the amount
of $6,267.43.3 (R., p.47; see R., pp.53-77 (records of Ms. Caruso’s payments).) She
had gotten married, and she and her husband were starting a new life with their
children. (R., p.47.) The district court granted the request to place Ms. Caruso on
unsupervised probation. (R., p.44.)

Like this case, the other initial sentence had been for a unified term of ten years, with
two years fixed, but it has since been reduced to a unified term of five years, with two
years fixed. (See Tr., p.12, Ls.1-4.) That sentence is not on appeal here.
2 The minutes of the rider review hearing indicate the term of probation was to be for
seven years (R., p.37), but the order revoking probation stated it was for a term of ten
years. (R., p.38.)
3 The restitution order was joint and several with Ms. Caruso’s co-defendant from the
underlying theft case. (R., p.37.)
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Things started to change when Ms. Caruso subsequently suffered a back injury.
(See, e.g., PSI, p.8 (her husband’s statement to the presentence investigator).) That
injury resulted in Ms. Caruso losing her job because she could not do the work. (PSI,
p.10.)

She was prescribed Oxycontin by one of her doctors, and that triggered a

relapse.4 (PSI, p.10.) Although her husband tried to give Ms. Caruso the benefit of the
doubt, when he learned she had been lying about her drug use, their marriage fell apart.
(PSI, p.8.) Rather than seeking help, Ms. Caruso admitted she allowed the relapse to
continue. (See PSI, p.11.) Ultimately, a motion for probation violation was filed alleging
Ms. Caruso had been charged with a new offense of theft for switching price tags on
some items, which Ms. Caruso explained she hoped to give her children as birthday
gifts, but could not otherwise afford. (R., pp.79, 91.)
Ms. Caruso admitted that probation violation, and the district court retained
jurisdiction again. (R., pp.107-08.) Ms. Caruso completed all the assigned programs
during her rider and had no disciplinary actions filed against her. (PSI, pp.51-56.) As a
result, Ms. Caruso’s sentence was suspended for another three years of probation.
(R., pp.112-14.)
Unfortunately, this period of probation was not as successful as her first. Several
months in, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging multiple violations of
the terms of her probation, including that she had committed several new offenses, not
completed treatment, absconded supervision, and used methamphetamine and
marijuana. (R., pp.117-19, 139-42.) Ms. Caruso ultimately admitted to several of those

During her rider program, a drug screening tool revealed that Ms. Caruso had
substance abuse issues with methamphetamine and marijuana. (PSI, p.334.) She
admitted to struggling with her addictions since age 13. (PSI, p.214.)
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violations.5 (Tr., p.5, Ls.6-9.) At the disposition hearing, Ms. Caruso expressed her
remorse and accepted responsibility for her actions, recognizing they stemmed from her
continued drug use and that she “had the tools to remain sober. I chose not to use
them.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.18-20.) The prosecutor recommended Ms. Caruso’s sentence be
executed in this case, noting that Ms. Caruso’s other initial sentence, as well as a new
sentence for one of the new offenses, had already been executed. (Tr., p.9, Ls.11-17.)
Defense counsel did not disagree with that recommendation, but he did explain that the
district court judge addressing the other initial sentence had reduced the indeterminate
term of that sentence. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-4.) As such, he moved the district court in this
case do the same or commute the sentence in this case altogether. (Tr., p.12, Ls.5-16.)
The district court denied Ms. Caruso’s motion to reduce her sentence, explaining,
“I don’t believe -- except in very unusual cases -- in adjusting a sentence that was
suspended when a person violates especially when they commit new offenses.”
(Tr., p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.2.) The district court also pointed out that Ms. Caruso would be
getting credit for time served (ultimately calculated to be 595 days), which “[a]ffects the
base on my case pretty substantially.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.4-5; R., p.172.)

Therefore, it

decided “a long period of time of supervision is wise; particularly when this is a case
where it looks like you dropped your guard and just went back to using totally in a fairly
late stage in the game. And so that kind of makes me think that it would be prudent to
keep an eye on things.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-11.) Accordingly, it revoked Ms. Caruso’s

It does not appear those admissions were part of a plea agreement, as no terms of
such an agreement were put on the record. (See generally R., Tr.)
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probation and executed her sentence without modification.

(R., pp.171-72.)

Ms. Caruso filed a notice of appeal timely from that order. (R., pp.174-75.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Caruso’s Rule 35
motion for sentence reduction.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Caruso’s Rule 35 Motion
For Sentence Reduction
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 is addressed
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

“The criteria for examining rulings

denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether
the original sentence was reasonable.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). As such, the Court should evaluate whether a lesser sentence would serve the
goals of sentencing: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997). The protection of society is
the primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497,
500 (1993).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation

“should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.”
State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in
State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
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In this case, the mitigating factors demonstrate a sentence reduction would best
serve all the goals sentencing. After all, this case has been ongoing for nearly the same
length of time as just serving the initial underlying sentence would have. (Compare
R., pp.107-08 (imposing an unified ten-year sentence); with Tr., p.11, Ls.14-15 (defense
counsel noting, at the most recent disposition hearing, the case had been proceeding
for nine years).) Ms. Caruso has shown some ability to be a successful and contributing
member of society, completing nearly seven years during her first term of probation
without a violation. (See R., p.38 (order suspending sentence entered on November 1,
2006); R., p.79 (motion for probation violation alleging a violation occurring on
August 18, 2013).) Additionally, she expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for
her actions. (Tr., p.12, Ls.18-20.) She also explained how she intended to prepare
herself for her ultimate release back into society: “I am looking at this prison sentence
as optimistically to get to the work center to get a job, have money to get a place, car
again, and build my life backup. . . . I am looking at this as a good thing instead of a bad
thing and hopefully get my life together.” (Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.6.)
The district court’s statement in denying the motion to reduce her sentence in
light of those mitigating factors – that it does not usually reduce sentences when
revoking probation when the alleged violations involve new charges – is concerning
because those new charges had already been addressed in another court.6

Cf.

State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]hile the district court may
properly take into consideration [the defendant’s] other criminal conduct, . . . sentence

For example, the prosecutor informed the district court that Ms. Caruso had been
ordered to serve a term of incarceration for the new felony charge underlying one of the
alleged probation violations. (See Tr., p.9, Ls.13-14.
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must be rendered with the recognition that [the defendant] has already been sentenced
for those related offenses, and the court’s focus at resentencing must be on
determination for the appropriate sentence for the burglary that is before the court.”)
While the consideration of the facts of the other cases here is not as direct or extensive
as it was in Findeisen, the principle behind that decision is still applicable to
Ms. Caruso’s case.
In Ms. Caruso’s case, that principle indicates the district court’s expressed
justification for not reducing the term of sentence – that the alleged violations included
new charges – is not as strong as it might be in other cases; that this is one of
the “unusual cases” where a sentence reduction is still appropriate. (See Tr., p.13,
Ls.24-25.) That is evident from the mitigating factors in the record: the sentence is
being executed some nine years after it was originally imposed, Ms. Caruso
demonstrated an ability to be successful on probation before suffering an injury which
cost her her job, her sobriety, and her husband, and she has taken the first steps toward
rehabilitation by expressing her remorse and accepting responsibility for her inability to
maintain her sobriety after completing her most recent rider program. Thus, the district
court abused its discretion in this case by denying Ms. Caruso’s motion for sentence
reduction.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Caruso respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court
for a new disposition hearing.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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